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1. Nukes: Spreading fast
2. Atomic bomb
primer
3. Lazy man's atomic bomb?
4. Nuclear hound dog
A portable radiation detector was tested in
a 2002 survey in the Republic of Georgia.Photo: Petr Pavlicek, International
Atomic Energy Agency.
At a machine tool factory in Iraq, an IAEA
inspector took smear samples to be tested for tell-tale radioactive
isotopes. Photo: International
Atomic Energy Agency.
A
sample of sulfur phosphate in Iraq was found to contain a small
amount of uranium. Photo: Petr
Pavlicek, International
Atomic Energy Agency. |
By nature, nuclear-bomb programs are secretive, at least until the first test explosion. How do nuclear sleuths track "progress" toward nuclear weapons?
 A nuclear bomb program,
especially one that relies on plutonium, can leave a lot of telltale
signs. After plutonium
is made in a nuclear reactor, the fuel rods are ground up and dissolved in
acid in a reprocessing plant. Both the reactor and reprocessing plant
are fairly easy
to spot from a satellite. The reprocessing process also emits rare radioactive
gases that can be a sure sign of nuclear activity. While a separation plant
making highly enriched uranium needs neither nuclear reactor nor reprocessing
plant,
it may still be visible from space.
Although many people question
the aggressiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency, "A fair number of interesting things have been found through IAEA inspections," says Clifford Singer of the University of Illinois. "They
are what made it clear that North Korea was doing more than it said, and
that the Iranians have some highly enriched uranium. The IAEA has been instrumental
in sorting out what has been going on in Libya, and it did a pretty good
job in Iraq, a lot better than the U.S. government."
Proliferators rely on a
network of nuclear-engineering and transportation firms, and specialized
publications covering those fields are a good source of clues, says William
Potter of the Monterey Institute. "My own research suggested that there was a tremendous amount of information available in trade publications." For example, in 1991, Potter says he and his colleagues published a picture of an Iraqi separation centrifuge, "with all the parts identified." Even before UN inspectors went into Iraq, "We were able, through open sources, to attach the names of firms and countries to each centrifuge part. It's an illustration of what one could do with open sources." So why didn't the U.S. government express more fascination with these sources? Perhaps, Potter says, because of their very openness: Government intelligence folks "equate
being classified with being important and correct."
Mark Gorwitz, an
independent researcher from California, has tracked budding nuclear weapons programs for
20 years by reading scientific publications. Gorwitz, who says he does "old-style detective work" at big libraries, observes that, "Scientists love to publish, to advance in the world." He says bits and pieces can be extremely informative once you know the context. "When
[Pakistani proliferator A.Q.] Khan's articles started coming out in the late
'80s or early '90s, if you were familiar with European centrifuge patents...
it showed that the Pakistanis had a great grasp of the literature, that they
knew what they were doing."
 Open-source literature also sheds light on the intriguing origins of nuclear-research students, he adds. "The French have ... trained lots of people how to use sold calutrons [another isotope separation technology], supposedly for medical purposes. But if you look at the names, you see Israelis studying down the hall from Iranians, Iraqis." Since all three countries were actively pursuing nuclear-bomb research, he says it's logical to suspect that the research goal was more sinister than treating cancer.
Do some research in our nuclear-proliferation bibliography.
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